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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1792 
 ___________ 
 
 JAY L. THOMAS, Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 CARE PLUS OF NEW JERSEY, INC. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-03493) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible  
 Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 31, 2012 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, 
 
Circuit Judges  
 (Opinion filed: June 8, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jay Thomas, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the dismissal of his 
lawsuit against the defendant, Care Plus of New Jersey (“Care Plus”).  For the reasons 
that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 In his amended complaint, Thomas sought relief against Care Plus under Title VI 
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of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000d), the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq.), and theories of breach of fiduciary duty.  Care Plus 
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that several of Thomas’s claims were barred by 
res judicata and the applicable statutes of limitation.  Care Plus also maintained that 
Thomas had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The District 
Court agreed with Care Plus and dismissed the complaint.  See generally Thomas v. Care 
Plus of N.J., Inc.
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, exercising plenary review over the 
District Court’s order granting Care Plus’s motion to dismiss, accepting all well-pleaded 
allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Thomas’s 
favor.  
, No. 11–CV–3493, 2012 WL 646023 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012).  This 
appeal followed. 
Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  As 
affirmative defenses, limitations defenses should generally be presented in an answer and 
not in a motion to dismiss; however, the “law of this Circuit . . . permits a limitations 
defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), but only if the time alleged in the 
statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the 
statute of limitations.”  Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotations, citations omitted).  We may therefore affirm on the basis of a limitations 
dismissal when the defect is apparent from the face of the complaint.  
 Thomas’s first two claims, which are based on Care Plus’s alleged violations of 
Title VI and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, are clearly barred by the statute 
Id. 
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of limitations.  Claims brought under Title VI are subject to the same limitations period 
as claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 
710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77–78 (3d 
Cir. 1989)).  In New Jersey, the relevant period is two years from date of accrual.  See 
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998).  The statute of 
limitations for all Law Against Discrimination claims is also two years from date of 
accrual.  Montells v. Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 658–60 (N.J. 1993).  Construing liberally 
Thomas’s allegations, see Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1990), we observe 
that neither his original nor his amended complaint alleges harm suffered or retaliation 
taken within two years of the date he first filed his lawsuit: June 16, 2011.  Thomas has 
not availed himself of the numerous opportunities to demonstrate that an exception to the 
limitations period applies.1  Further amendment of the complaint would therefore be 
“inequitable or futile.”  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny
 With regard to Thomas’s fiduciary-duty claim, we will assume, without deciding, 
that Thomas and his doctor did have a “fiduciary” relationship as contemplated by New 
Jersey law.  
, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). 
See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.
                                                 
1 In his summary action response, he argues that his “factual allegations of retaliation 
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination . . . [represent] a common law tort 
where the statute of limitation is six years.”  At least one of the statutes upon which he 
relies, however, explicitly excludes personal injury actions from the six-year limitations 
period.  Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1 (establishing six-year statute of limitations 
“for any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in sections 2A:14-2 and 2A:14-
3 of this Title”), with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (establishing two-year statute of 
, 800 A.2d 73, 78 (N.J. 
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2002).  Having so assumed, we agree with the District Court that breach of this kind of 
“fiduciary relationship” is akin to a personal-injury action, which (as above) is governed 
by a two-year statute of limitations.  Cf. Balliet v. Fennell, 845 A.2d 168, 172–73 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).  Hence, the third claim is also barred by the limitations 
period.2
 Finally, the District Court denied Thomas’s motion for default judgment.   
 
There is no indication on the District Court docket of Thomas’s effecting service of the 
summons on Care Plus.  Since the twenty-one-day period of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(a)(1)(A)(i) had not yet started, Care Plus was not in default.  Therefore, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enter a default judgment.  See 
Chamberlain v. Giampapa
 In sum, we find that this appeal does not present a substantial question, and will 
therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also
                                                                                                                                                             
limitations for “[e]very action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful 
act, neglect or default of any person within this State”).  
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  To the 
extent that Thomas’s filings in this Court request independent relief, they are denied.  
2 In the alternative, we would affirm on the basis of Thomas’s failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.  Claim three is a threadbare recitation of the elements 
of a cause of action, lacking sufficient factual material to show that the claim is facially 
plausible.  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations, 
quotations omitted).   
